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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
CLAR.EN,CE DAHL, 
d.h.a. DIXIE ~rOTORS, 
Plaintiff an.d Resp·ondent, 
vs. 
Case No. 7532 
A.i~TONE B. PRIN·CE, 
D:efendant and Appellard, 
C. G. GREEN, 
Intervenor a.nd Appellan.t. 
BRIEF OF APPELLAN·TS 
STATEMENT OF FACT'S 
Intervenor appeals from a judgment of the district 
court for Washington County holding void the claim of 
intervenor as attaching creditor of E. E. Garn and ·Cleo 
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V. Garn. The evidence was stipulated and the questions 
involved on the appeal are whether the findings of fact 
support the judgment. Defendant Sheriff also appeals. 
C. G. Green commenced an action on contract in the 
Third District Court against E. E. Garn and his wife, 
Cleo, and had a writ of attachment issue. The writ di-
rected the defendant Sheriff to attach a Buick automobile 
registered to the Garns and the car was attached while 
in the possession of E. E. Garn, (Tr. 12-13). The respon-
dent brought this action in claim and delivery against 
the Sheriff CTr. 1, 2). Thereupon Green intervened and 
by his attorney defended the Sheriff. Appellant alleged, 
and it was found by the Court that he had checked the 
Motor Vehicle Records of the State Tax Commission and 
had found that his debtors owned the said Buick, subject 
to the lien of Brads·haw Chevrolet, whereupon a suit had 
been commenced on Fe,bruary 7, 1949 and the Buick at-
tached on Feb. 17, 1949. (Tr. 13, Findings 4, 5, 6). 
It further appears from the Findings that after the 
suit was commenced and the writ obtained the Garns 
traded the Buick in to the respondent on a truck on Feb-
ruary 10, 1949. The Garns drove the truck, leaving the 
Buick in appellant's possession until on or about Febru-
ary 17 when the respondent let Garns take the Buick 
while ·repairs were made on the truck. (Finding (7) Tr. 
13). No change was made or initiated on the Motor 'T e-
hicle Records of the State Tax ~Commission (Tr. 13) and 
both the appellant and respondents acted in good faith. 
(Tr. 13-14). 
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The District ·Court (Judge A. H. Ellett sitting for 
Judge Hoyt) held that as between Garns and respondent 
the respondent \Yas the O"\Vner and had the right of pos-
session (Conclusion 3~ Tr. 14) and that the failure to 
apply for transfer of title on the l\Iotor \T ehicle records 
resulted in no bett~r right in appellant than his dehtor 
had. (Tr. 14). The Trial Court also allowed respondent 
$200.00 for attorney's fees and costs. (Tr. 14). 
POINTS RELIED ON 
I. Under Utah Statutes interests in an automobile 
are measurable by the records of the Motor Vehicle 
Department as against an attaching creditor relying on 
the records. 
II. The judgment allowing attorney fees was er-
roneous. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Under Utah Staf1tt·es interests in an automobile .are 
measurable by the records of the Motor Vehicle D·epart-
ment as against an attaching creditor relying on the 
records. 
Section 57-3a-72, U.C.A. 19·43 provides: 
Until the department shall have issuerl such 
new certificate of registration and rer6ficate of 
o\vnership, delivery of any vehicle required to be 
registered shall be deerned not to have heen n1a(le 
and title thereto ~hall he rleemed not to have 
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4 
passed, and said intended transfer sha~l be 
deemed to 1be incomplete and not to he v~bd ?r 
effective for any purpose except as p~roVIded In 
section 7 6 of this act. 
This is similar to the statutory rule relating to chat-
tels generally and suggests that prevention of fraud was 
the legislature's motive. IStection 33-1-14, U. C. A. 1943 
provides: 
Every sale made by a seller of goods or chat-
tels in his possession or under his control, and 
every assignment of goods and chattels, unless 
the same is accompanied by a delivery within a 
reasonable time, and is followed by an actual and 
continued change of the possession of the things 
sold or assigned, shall be conclusive evidence of 
fraud· as against the creditors of the seller or 
assignor, or subsequent purchasers in good faith. 
The word ''creditors'' as used in this section shall 
he construed to include all persons who shall be 
creditors of the seller or assignor at any tjme 
while such goods and eha t tels shall remain in hj s 
possession or under hiR control. 
It is reasonable to assume that these sections mean 
what they say and that when the registered owner of a 
motor vehicle is in possession of it a creditor can rely 
on the statute as establishing ownership without asking 
the debtor about possible claims by third parties. An 
automohile dealer such as respondent cannot complain 
if he is held to a compliance with the statute before his 
claim to ownership is established. 
This statute has been before this ~Court in Swa,rtz vs. 
White, 80 Utah 150, 13 P. 2nd 643 ; J·ackson vs. James, 
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97 Utah 41, 89 P. 2nd 235 ~ and Stewa.rt vs. C~o1nmerce 
Ins. Co. of Glen Palls, [Ttah, 198 P. 2nd 467. 
In the latter ras~ the court held that title had not 
passed to a purchaser "?here ·only one of six heirs had 
transferred his interest· and title papers had been de-
livered to the hnyer rbut no application for change of 
registration had been made. 
In Szrartz L,s. Whit-e, supra, the court held that a 
per~on in possession of a car and title papers by trick 
eannot transfer a good title to a buyer, because that is 
not in compliance with the above quoted statute (then 
sec. 3972x, Comp Laws 1917 as amended) and at p. 646 
of 13 P. 2nd this Court said: 
"The words of the statute, italirized by us, 
are clear and unamhiguons and undonbJedly n1ean 
\Vhat they say. Any claimed transfer from Mrs. 
'Vhite to Ste,vart \Vas jncomplete. Title had not 
passed and the transfer was not valid or effec-
tive for any purpose." 
This language '''"ould settle the matter were it not 
for Jackson vs. Jam.es, swp111a.. That ease holds that as 
between donor and donee the statute is not controlling 
but that it is as to third persons. The facts in Jackson 
vs. ,]a.m.es involve a gift completed by delivery and con-
tinued possession, without any change ·on the l\fotor 
\ 7 ehicle records. The registered owner died and his donee 
claimed the car against the administrator and the estate. 
This Court held that passage of title could be accom-
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plished without change in the records of the Motor 
Vehicle Dep~artment, as section 71 (now 57-3a-72) "is not 
to he construed ... as absolute and mandatory to pass 
a title . . . ''' And then said at pp. 45-46 : 
''In the light of the whole chapter it is evi-
dent that its provisions were written to protect 
innocent purchasers and third parties from fraud 
hut was not intended to be controlling as between 
the parties to the transaction.'' 
This language likewise upholds the position of ap-
pellant here and suggests no reason why an attaching 
creditor cannot rely on the Motor Vehicle records. Mr. 
Justice Wolfe's dissenting opinion cites several cases 
involving and protecting attaching creditors in situations 
similar to the instant case. No case has been found 
under a similar statute where the claim of an attaching 
creditor was defeated hy a transfer of title not reflected 
on the records of the state's motor vehicle department. 
A case like ours, holding for the attaching creditor 
under the similar California statute is Samuels vs. Bar-
net, 79 Cal. A·pp. 529, 2'50 P. 406. Support of the same 
position is found in Cramdall vs. Sha,y, 61 Cal. App. 56, 
214 P. 450; Du Puy vs. Shay, 127 ·Cal. App. 476, 16 P. 
2nd 158; Parag,ould Wholesale Grocery vs. Middleton, 
235 :S.W. 469, 208 Mo. App. 592. 
And under section 33-1-14 U.C.A. 1943, supra, appel-
lant should prevail, as the transferee had not main-
tained ''actual and continued change of the possession.'' 
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Slaton vs. Dar is, 1_18 Okl. 92, 246 Pac. 863; Thierin.g vs. 
Gage, 132 Ore. 92, 284 Pac. 832: W-endel vs. A-9m·ith, 291 
Pa. 2-17, 139 ~~\t. 873: Hogan Fiwa.nee and Mortgage Co. 
vs. Mead, 205 Cal. l, 269 Pac. 610: Gern.erd vs. Union 
lndemnit,u Co. 311 Pa. 169, 165 At. 405: J(.alp•lenski vs. 
Ho.ru·it.z, 114 Conn. 523, 159 At. 351; GMAC vs. Wigger, 
249 Ky. 722, 61 S.W. 2nd 620. 
II. 
The .iud_r}Jnenf allou;ing attorney fees was err10neous. 
Appellant is at a loss to know upon what theory 
attorney fees "\vere allowed to respondent. The complaint 
does not ask for attorney fees (Tr. 2) and neither does 
the ans,ver to the complaint in intervention (Tr. 9). The 
Court brought up~ the question without support of any 
pleading ( Tr. 22-23) and the discussion between the 
Court and counsel is not included in the transcript. 
In the absence of statute or punitive damages at-
torney fees are generally not allowable. 15 Am. Jur. 551; 
25 C.J.S. 531; Guay ns. Brothrrhood Btttilding Associa-
tion, 87 N.H. 216, 177 At. 409, 97 AI_jR 1053. 
The Utah statute on motor vehicle registration re-
quires a purchaser to obtain ne"\v registration and until 
that has been done the title is deemed not to have passed. 
ThP respondent here is an automobile dealer and had 
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ample time to request a new registration certificate be-
fore the attachment here involved. His failure so to 
do misled and injured ap~pellant and the statute p-rotects 
appellant's attachment of the car in the possession of 
the registered owner. 
No judgment for attorney fees was prayed for, and 
none is allowable in a claim and delivery action. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARDS AND BIRD 
Attorneys for Appellant 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
